A Microsatellite  Space Guard  Force by Bille, Matt et al.
SSC99-III-6
1
Matt Bille                 13th Annual  AIAA/USU Small Satellite Conference
A Microsatellite “Space Guard” Force
Matt Bille (AIAA Member), Robyn Kane,
and Martin Oetting, ANSER
1250 Academy Park Loop #119




Air Force Research Lab
150 Vandenberg St.




The microsatellites now under development will be capable of a variety of inspection, surveillance,
servicing, and propulsion services.  As the military and commercial importance of space increases, a
practical near-term use of this technology will be to provide the kind of services in space that the U.S.
Coast Guard provides on Earth. The Coast Guard provides the U.S. coastal waters with law
enforcement, search and rescue, safety inspection, and a myriad of other services.  All these services
are needed in the near-Earth region as well, and will become more critical as thousands of additional
satellites are launched.   A “Space Guard” constellation of microsatellites would use the technology
being developed under the XSS-10, Mightysat, and other programs to provide similar services,
beginning with low Earth orbit (LEO).  Space Guard satellites could evaluate damaged satellites,
enforce treaties by inspection, monitor traffic in key orbits, and report collision hazards, If needed,
microsats could attach thrusters or tether packages to move or deorbit a disabled satellite.  While an
independent agency or international consortium could eventually operate the Guard, its initial
deployment would most likely be under U.S. Space Command. This paper assesses  the requirements
and technology involved in the Space Guard proposal, along with possible operational structures and
initial cost estimates.  The Space Guard concept is a vital one.  Microsatellites are the most affordable
and effective way to put it into practice.
Introduction
As the explosion in use of space, especially the
increasingly crowded LEO belt, continues,
space planners are faced with a situation
analogous to what the U.S. government dealt
with in the early years of the Nation’s
existence.  Coastal water traffic was increasing
rapidly and haphazardly.  This trade was
important for the new nation’s economic well-
being and a vital source of revenue.  But it had
to be regulated, required taxes and fees
collected, and the safety of the vessels involved
had to be ensured.  This led to the creation in
1789 of the Revenue Marine and the Lighthouse
Service.  These two organizations were later
combined into  the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).
Today, most nations with sea coasts have
similar services.  Some are military, some
civilian, and some, like the USCG, have dual
identities.  Their functions vary, but most have
responsibilities which include the inspection of
ships, maintenance of navigational aids,
nforcement of laws, collection of revenue, and
search and rescue.
Billions of dollars' worth of satellites are now in
orbit, providing services so vital that space is
ref rred to as a new economic center of gravity.
A 1999 forecast by the Teal Group estimated
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that 1,447 additional satellites, valued at $126.8
billion, will be orbited from 2000-2009.1
There are only a few international treaties in
place to regulate this traffic, and there is no
enforcement, rescue, or centralized traffic-
deconfliction body.  As space’s importance to
Earth commerce will only increase, it is time to
examine the options for a “Space Guard” – a
Coast Guard in space.2
This requirement arises at the same time a
promising technology is becoming mature.  That
technology is microsatellites.  Microsats,
offering low-cost, rapid-response spacecraft
able to perform a variety of functions, can be
the “Coast Guard cutters” of the new space
service.
Background
Since 1957, thousands of satellites have been
launched into orbit, along with countless upper
stages, shrouds, and other hardware.  The
North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) Space Surveillance Network (SSN)
today maintains orbital element sets for some
8,000 objects, and many more are too small or
too eccentric in their orbits to be catalogued.
The debris now in orbit totals an estimated
4,000 metric tons, with 175 metric tons added
every year.3
With the launching of major constellations of
commercial satellites, the economic importance
of space and its relative crowding will increase
once more.  Iridium has 77 satellites in orbit
(not all functional), ORBCOMM 36, and
Teledesic alone will add 288.    Many of these
are concentrated along particular inclination
“belts,” such as the 56-degree inclination, which
will become very busy as construction and
operation of the International Space Station
(ISS) proceeds.
The Air University study Spacecast 2020 put
the problem this way: "The explosion in the
number of satellites will create increasing
numbers of conflicts between the vehicles – and
their Earth-bound owners…space will become a
very busy place.  Who will monitor, regulate,
a d provide stability for all these  hurtling
pieces of high technology?”4
Complications will inevitably arise from the
ever-increasing use of space. Nonfunctioning
satellites, from microsats to a giant $800M
Milstar launched in 1999, are in orbit without
power or command capability.  While slots in
t e geosynchronous orbit (GEO) belt are
governed by international agreement, there are
no enforcement mechanisms for this
arrangement, and no analogous governing
regimes for satellites in other orbits.
Where satellites are concentrated, so is space
junk.  In June 1999, NASA attempted to move
the ISS because of a collision hazard posed by
Russian space debris.    The object missed  the
ISS – which was fortunate, since the ISS’
t rusters could not be fired due to human
error.5
So far, there has been one confirmed instance
wh re a satellite was damaged by collision.
This was in 1996, when a spent booster stage
collided with the Cerise microsatellite.  It is
logical to assume that increased use of space
will bring more such instances.
For the Space Guard to have maximum
ef ectiveness, the capability to track space
obj cts will also need upgrading.  The SSN,
which is the world’s most capable tracking
system today,  can track only objects over 10
centimeters (cm) in diameter, and it cannot
track objects continuously.  Space objects are
monitored each time they break “fences”
erected by ground-based radar.  There is no
way to follow an object with an eccentric path –
f r example, a malfunctioning satellite firing  its
thrusters in an unpredictable  pattern – to see if
a hazard is being posed at any given moment.
A 1997 report by the General Accounting
Office concluded the U.S. needed to add the
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capability to track smaller objects – down to 1
cm, if possible – and the ability to precisely
locate tracked objects in space.6
One solution is to put space surveillance
capability into orbit, where the field of view
would exceed that of any terrestrial sensor and
the obscuring effects of Earth's atmosphere are
not present.  The feasibility of this is being
demonstrated now using the Space-Based
Visible (SBV) sensor on the Midcourse Space
Experiment (MSX) satellite.7 Air Force Space
Command (AFSPC) plans to develop a Space-
Based Electro-Optical Network (SBEON) using
three satellites in GEO.  Another approach is to
have tracking spacecraft which can follow
(physically or by sensors) a threatening object.
The optimum approach may be a mix of
ground- and space-based capabilities, with
something like the current SSN (which could
include the current ground-based sensors plus
SBEON) providing global monitoring while
Space Guard microsats add space object
identification (SOI) capabilities for heavily-used
orbits or conduct special searches to more
precisely locate possibly-threatening objects
detected by the SSN.
Finally, there is currently no way to perform a
close inspection of  a satellite.  Ground-based
and aircraft-based telescopes can provide some
data on  the status of a malfunctioning object in
low orbit,  but these sensors are limited both in
field of view and in resolution.
Why Microsatellites ?
The need for a Space Guard would be irrelevant
if there were no affordable means for deploying
the needed capabilities.  Until recently, this was
the case.  Fortunately, while space launch
remains expensive, technology now exists to
develop microsatellites which can track debris,
inspect space objects, deorbit dead satellites,
and perform the other functions required.
Microsats (defined here as satellites under 100
kilograms (kg)  wet mass) are also cheaper to
launch.  A smaller satellite needs a smaller
launch vehicle, and microsats can also take
advantage of the secondary payload
opportunities that exist on large expendable
launch vehicles (ELVs) and the Space Shuttle.
Tw nty years from now, the Space Guard role
may be filled by crewed or uncrewed reusable
launch vehicles (RLVs), which will operate
much in the way aircraft do today.  The
development of RLVs, however, is an extremely
xpensive enterprise, and it is impossible to
predict when space access via RLV will become
truly routine.  If we want to create a Space
Guard in the near term, microsats are the only
affordable way to do it.
Policy and Requirements
The cornerstone of space law is the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty, which declares space is not
subject to appropriation, establishes the right of
free transit of space, and forbids the stationing
of weapons of mass destruction in space.  Other
agreements worth mentioning include the
Liability Convention, which establishes that
each nation is responsible for damage done by
its space objects, and the Registration
Convention, which requires all nations to
r lease basic information on each satellite
placed in orbit.
While there is no legal regime in place
specifically providing for a function like the
Space Guard, there is also none prohibiting it.
If, for example, U.S. Space Command deployed
Space Guard microsatellites to support U.S.-
owned satellites, no treaty problems would
arise.  As one space law authority, Professor
Jo nne Gabrynowicz, points out, problems may
arise when conflicts with other nations' satellites
appear.  Satellites are the sovereign property of
the launching nation, and any contact with a
satellite may be construed as a violation of
national sovereignty.8 (Passive inspection which
does not interfere with the operation of the
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target satellite is permissible.)
For example, assume a nonfunctional Russian
satellite presents a hazard to an American
satellite.  The U.S. would need to contact
Russia and request permission to have the
Space Guard move or deorbit the Russian
satellite.  In this case, since Russia would be
liable for the damage its satellite causes, the
Russians should be amenable to allowing such
action.  They might even share the costs of the
operation, a subject discussed later in this paper.
If the Russian and American satellites in this
example were both operational, and therefore
valuable, the negotiations would be more
complex.  It would certainly be in both
countries' interests to solve the problem, and so
it's reasonable to assume a solution would be
worked out.
The alternative to a U.S.-directed Space Guard
would be to begin broad negotiations now to
establish an international legal regime.  While
there are definite advantages to having such  a
regime in place, such as being able to take
action without negotiating with each
government involved every time there was a
problem, it would probably take years to
establish the required agreements.  A middle
ground might be for the U.S. to move
simultaneously along  parallel paths: establishing
a Space Guard for support of U.S. satellites
while sponsoring an international working
group to broaden the use of the Space Guard in
the future.
Hazards of Space Commerce
Many of the hazards involved in space
commerce are analogous to those in maritime
commerce.  They include collisions with
derelicts and debris: collision with other vessels:
dangers posed by vessels operating without
proper  regard for the "rules of the road:"
natural hazards (in space, solar flares and
meteors): and the rare but genuine possibility of
outright “piracy” or other hostile acts.
While NORAD maintains a relatively complete
talog of space objects within the detectable
size range, the agency has no capacity to take
any action to mitigate any hazards that may be
detected.  Neither the U.S. nor any other nation
has a capability to eliminate or redirect space
debris. The U.S. Space Shuttle offers a limited
capability to retrieve or fix dead satellites, but
only in certain orbits and with months of lead
time.
Where will inspection requirements and
c llision hazards arise?  The two LEO orbits
most in need of assistance will probably be the
56.1-dgree inclination, where the ISS and all its
support flights will operate, and the sun-
synchronous orbit around 98 degrees, where
many imaging and scientific missions are placed.
The Clarke belt (GEO) offers a unique case,
since its limited numbers of slots are doled out
by international agreement and can be blocked
by malfunctioning or illegally placed satellites
(both of which have happened).  While
technology and costs make it simpler to deploy
the first wave of Space Guard microsats into
LEO, a GEO follow-on should receive serious
c nsideration.
Another hazard, paradoxically, is created by
efforts to mitigate the orbital debris problem.
Many launch vehicle upper stages, like the Delta
2, are maneuvered after payload delivery to
lower their orbits so they will re-enter within
two years.  However, only Russia's Proton
actually makes a de-orbit burn.  Other stages
enter randomly, with some chance that debris
will survive re-entry and impact populated
areas.9  If Space Guard microsats could closely
monitor such re-entries, the ability to predict
impact times and locations would be greatly
improved.  A step beyond this would be to use
G ard microsats to intercept particularly
threatening stages and impart a corrective force
to ensure they come down over ocean areas.
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Options for Space Guard Organization
The first-generation Space Guard, if deployed
within the next five years, would almost
certainly have to be operated by U.S. Space
Command.  No other agency currently in
existence has a comparable network of tracking
systems, command capability, etc.
In the long run, an international agency could be
created, but duplication of existing facilities
would not be cost-effective.  The NORAD-run
SSN, for example, would probably continue to
be part of such an effort.  Whether the effort is
national or international, the existing Space
Control Center (SCC) in NORAD's Cheyenne
Mountain installation in Colorado is a logical
place to collate the sensor data, while operating
the Microsats from existing AFSCN
installations at Schriever Air Force Base in
Colorado also seems logical.  Personnel from
civilian agencies or international partners could
be part of the teams involved.
There are many precedents for military
involvement in functions which are in part
civilian or international.  The U.S. Coast Guard
is a part of the Department of Transportation in
peacetime, but has military responsibilities and
is placed under the U.S. Navy in time of war.
The U.S. Air Force runs the GPS satellite
system, which provides services worldwide to
all types of users.
Microsatellite Capabilities Required
A Space Guard  capable of mitigating all the
hazards described for far would need certain
capabilities, including the ability to:
1. Inspect a satellite
2. Deorbit a satellite
3. Alter the orbit of a satellite
4. Deorbit or deflect space debris
It may be that not all these capabilities are
deployed, or that they are deployed gradually.
For example, an XSS-10-type microsat, capable
of locating and inspecting a target satellite,
might be the first "cutter" in the Space Guard's
inventory.  As technology is developed and
made affordable, other types of satellites could
be added.
There is always a balancing act between buying
a single system capable of many missions
(m aning the individual satellites will be heavier
and more expensive) vs. buying several types of
specialized satellites (which creates logistical
and operational challenges).
One way to approach this problem is to deploy
first what is available "on the shelf" (in this case,
microsats like the XSS-10) and make the
tradeoffs as microsatellite technology matures.
Miniaturization might advance to the point
where the replacements for these first satellites
could be multipurpose.  Another approach is to
take a bus like that of the XSS-10 and develop
a variety of front ends with "plug and play"
replaceability.
Alternatively, it might be more cost-effective to
keep buying XSS-10 derivatives for the track-
and-inspect missions and have specialized
repositioning and repair microsats.  The
lternatives will have to be analyzed before the
initial satellite buy and then revisited each time
acquisition of a new block of spacecraft is
planned.  The notional Space Guard plan
(below) includes three block purchases over a
15-year life span.
Technology Required
The critical technology - some of it on the shelf
and some still in development - can be broken
down by capabilities.
General
All microsat functions, even those already
space-proven, can benefit from further
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improvements in basic areas such as lightweight
buses, high-efficiency solar arrays, and more
efficient propulsion.  Promising efforts along
these lines include the composite buses, like the
all-composite structure of the FORTE satellite
for Los Alamos national Laboratory, flexible
thin-film solar arrays built by AFRL, integrated
tank/line/thruster designs such as the XSS-10's,
and "subsystemless" design principles, which
have been pursued by Ball Aerospace with the
concept of basing design on functions rather
than traditional subsystems.10
Other general features desirable in Space Guard
microsats include:
· Autonomy: Future satellites will need
to possess a high degree of autonomy,
both on board and with ground
command and control systems. This
can reduce operational costs and risks
associated with their missions.
· Sleep Modes: This technology could
extend on-orbit lifetimes by allowing
the satellite to essentially hibernate
between missions. All nonessential
subsystems and components are shut
down to the maximum extent
possible. This includes payload,
attitude control, and thermal. The
satellite can be reactivated via ground
command.
· Man-in-the-loop Control: This feature
allows for positive human control
during inspection and/or repositioning
activities. The command and
telemetry system will need to possess
adequate bandwidth to support this.
Also, the inertial environment of space
requires in-depth training and
familiarization for the operator.
Added Requirements for Specific Missions
Inspection: Inspection of a satellite for damage
 for illegal payloads (such as weapons of mass
destruction) requires the capability to move in
close, inspect from all sides, and provide video
and other data of sufficient resolution to obtain
the desired knowledge.  All this has to be done
without interfering with the target satellite's
trajectory or its function.  Such interference
could be viewed, justifiably, as an unfriendly
act, similar to impeding the passage of a ship on
this high seas.
This requires extremely precise maneuvering
capability and small, high-resolution sensors.
The sensor question may be resolved by the
Active Pixel Sensors (APS) developed at JPL.
These "cameras on a chip" require only a
fraction of the weight and power of current
CCD imagers.
Repositioning: Moving satellites, especially
satellites larger than the Space Guard microsat,
between orbits will require robotic grappling
devices to attach the microsat or a thruster
package for the time required and sufficient
delta-V on the part of the microsat to achieve
the changes in speed and direction required.
High-efficiency storable propulsion systems
should result in simpler, more reliable, and more
efficient propulsion.
Microsats might also be used in conjunction
with larger vehicles the Air Force Space
Command's planned Solar Orbital Transfer
Vehicle (SOTV).  A microsat might become the
front end of an SOTV and provide the "brains"
needed for a mission, or a microsat could direct
an orbiting satellite onto an orbit where the
more powerful SOTV could dock with it and
take over the task of orbit-changing.
If the microsat is to be capable of actually
docking to the target satellite and moving it,
repositioning capability will also require
adaptable guidance and control algorithms
capable of sensing and adjusting immediately to
the changed center of gravity and other
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characteristics of the combined spacecraft.
Deorbiting: Deorbiting a satellite (either a
nonfunctioning spacecraft or a hazardous piece
of debris, like a spent upper stage) is a similar
problem.  One solution in this case is for the
microsat to carry miniature tether packages, like
the "Remora Retriever" proposed by Tethers
Unlimited.11  These would weigh about 25 kg
and could allow the microsat to perform
another function while the tether slowly brought
down the offending space object.
Existing Programs to Leverage
The U.S. is developing a number  of
microsatellite programs with Space Guard
applicability.  Most notable is the XSS series
being developed by the Air Force Research
Laboratory.  These will have space surveillance
and space object identification capabilities,
augmented later with the ability to refuel and
reposition other satellites.
Other programs of note include the Daimler-
Chrysler Aerospace development of the second-
generation Inspektor satellite for the ISS.  This
satellite weighs only 8 kg and is designed for
close inspection.  It is powered by a cold-gas
propellant system, and can be recovered and re-
used.
Cost Estimates
If we assume that, for a first-generation Space
Guard, the existing U.S.- owned tracking and
command facilities, augmented when needed by
those of other nations, would be adequate, then
the major costs involve microsatellites and their
launch vehicles.
The XSS-10 microsatellite, with space tracking
and close inspection capabilities, was estimated
by Boeing to cost about $3.5M for the first
spacecraft or about $1.8M (hardware costs
alone) for a block of 20.12  Other costs include
storage facilities on the ground, launch, and
control of the microsats on orbit.  The control
function could be assumed largely by existing
Air Force Space Command and
USSPACECOM units.
To offer some sample cost projections for the
“base case” (lowest cost), we here make the
following assumptions:
1. The microsats used  are XSS-10 derivatives.
There are two types: Imagers (with wide-
angle surveillance and close-range
inspection capabilities) and Mechanics (able
to dock, transfer fluids, or reposition
satellites).  Both are assumed to cost
$3.5M each (all costs in Base Year 00
dollars) and have one-year life spans on
orbit.13  (The $3.5M cost is used here to be
very conservative, since Boeing's $1.8M
block estimate did not include any costs
other than hardware.  Using $3.5M  as a
fleet average cost also allows for the
presumably higher price per satellite of the
Mechanic type.)
2. Agencies already pursuing XSS-type
microsats, including AFSPC and AFRL,
have paid the research and development
costs of these satellites.
3. The Space Guard uses existing command
and control facilities, but a 12-person
branch (which may be a mix of military,
civilian, and/or international personnel) is
added to one of the space operations
squadrons at Schriever AFB.14
4. I  keeping with current USAF plans, launch
services are purchased, not launch vehicles.
5. From 2002 through 2026, two Imagers are
continually on orbit in the 56.1-degree the
98-degree inclinations.  Imagers are
replaced on an annual schedule using
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6. An average of one Mechanic a year is
launched on a dedicated small launcher
(Minuteman derivative or equivalent)
costing an average of $9M.15
Keeping in mind these assumptions represent a
single, simplified case out of many possibilities,
the top-level Work Breakdown  Structure looks
like this:
Space Guard System Costs
($M)
TOTAL 372.80
 EMD PHASE (EMD provided by AFRL, others)
 PRODUCTION PHASE 201.00
        PRIME MISSION EQUIPMENT 178.50
            SPACE VEHICLE SUBSYSTEM 178.50
                SPACE VEHICLE PME 178.50
                    Microsat Imager Satellite 115.50
                    Microsat Mechanic Satellite 63.00
        SYSTEM-LEVEL NON-PME ELEMENTS 12.75
                Spare Satellites under Space Vehicles
            SYSTEM DATA 0.02
            SYSTEMS ENGINEERING/PROGRAM MGT 3.61
            OTHER GOVERNMENT COSTS 9.12
                Contractor Support 9.12
        ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDERS (ECO) 9.74
 OPERATIONS & SUPPORT PHASE 171.80
        MISSION PERSONNEL 11.80
        Launch Services (Vehicle, range costs, etc.) 160.00
This total could be reduced if the Microcosm
Sprite launch vehicle becomes available.  Now
in development with AFRL support, the Sprite
is intended to provide rapid launch of a microsat
for under $2M.  This would shave $70M off the
base year cost estimate for launch services.16
Costs would also be cut if low-cost, rapid-
response service is established by one of the
companies, such as Kistler or Rotary Rocket,
now pursuing reusable launch vehicles.
Factors which could raise this estimate include:
· Additional failures (a total of 6 spare
satellites, three of each type, are
included in the above estimate.)
· Adding more capable microsats with
other missions.
· Insertion of additional technology,
especially if the Space Guard has to
provide its own research and
development.
· Adding GEO-capable microsats and
their launch services.
· Failure to obtain secondary payload
space suited to all Imager
requirements.
An annual budget averaging under $25M is a
small price to pay to safeguard billions of
dollars in LEO assets.  If one collision with the
$60-billion ISS is avoided, the Space Guard will
have paid for itself many times over.  The same
is true if Space Guard microsats can rescue one
high-cost satellite, such as Milstar, stranded in
the wrong orbit.  Finally, a demonstrated
capability to protect and/or rescue satellites
should result in lower insurance costs,
benefiting the entire space industry.
Options for Funding
The U.S. Coast Guard is funded by a mix of
direct tax support and fees collected for
services, such as boat registration.  The Space
Guard could be funded similarly.  A fee could
be charged to the launching nation for each
satellite placed in an orbit serviced by the Space
Guard.  It could also charge fees (if approved in
advance by treaty) to nations whose spacecraft
are helped in time of distress.
The Teal Group forecast assumed 1,447
satellites over 8 years, an annual rate of about
180.  A $25M budget divided by 180 would
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give a fee of $138,888.  This seems unpalatable,
especially since GEO satellites would receive
little direct benefit (although all satellites benefit
indirectly by the enforcement of space treaties),
so some level of funding by participating
governments would be needed to keep this
down.  Since the Space Guard would also serve
the higher purposes of treaty enforcement and
protect the gigantic international investment in
the ISS, such funding seems appropriate.
Funding the Space Guard may turn out to be
the cheapest way for satellite owners to meet
future requirements preventing orbital debris.
The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee is discussing guidelines requiring
satellite owners to remove satellites (either by
orbit-raising or de-orbiting) from heavily used
orbits.  An official with the French space
agency, CNES, has objected this is a very
expensive proposition, requiring perhaps 150kg
of fuel.17
Leaving aside the cost of designing and
installing larger fuel tanks (or using existing
tanks and accepting a shorter useful lifespan,
which is even less appealing), just placing an
extra 150kg into orbit, using a common rule of
$10K per kilogram, adds up to $1.5M per
satellite.  There is no mandatory rule so far
requiring this capability, but it's an issue to keep
in mind.  Paying fees to support the Space
Guard or paying the Guard directly each time a
satellite is removed would be attractive options
compared to building such capability into every
satellite launched.
Issues
That a Space Guard is desirable does not mean
there are no issues to resolve.  There are many.
For example:
If the U.S. leads in deploying the Guard, would
Guard microsats be used to interfere with
enemy satellites in wartime?  The inability to
perform counterspace activities is a major
deficiency in AFSPC plans, but whether the
Guard can have this function must be decided
b fore its is created, especially if the Guard will
have international aspects.  A possibility,
perhaps more palatable to potential partners,
would be to use the Guard for counterspace
only if the conflict is supported by a United
Nations resolution, as in the Persian Gulf War.
A related question is: If the Guard detects
unlawful activity, such as a weapon of mass
destruction on a satellite, what happens then?
Does the Guard have jurisdiction to act?  Again,
this type of situation should be decided in
advance and covered in any international
a reements involved.
How should the Guard deal with overlapping
jurisdiction?  Satellite ownership may be shared
between nations.  One owner might be willing
to cooperate with a Guard action, such as
moving their satellite to avoid a hazard, while
its partner may not.
Finally, there is the question of liability.  If
s tellite-owning companies or spacefaring
nations come to rely on the Space Guard, do
they have a claim if the Guard fails to respond
to, for example, a debris threat to a satellite?
Space treaties require that nations provide each
other with "all possible assistance" in space.
Having a Space Guard would raise considerably
the standard of what is "possible" and therefore
expected.18
Conclusion
The concept of a microsatellite-based Space
Guard appears both feasible and desirable.  The
exact shape and functions of such a system need
to be worked out over the next few years as the
technology matures.  This system is affordable
and highly cost-effective, since it would
maintain safe and orderly commerce worth
many billions of dollars.  It is not logical to wait
for more collisions, liability arguments, and
space policy disputes before beginning work on
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the Space Guard.  A proactive approach will
smooth the way for orbital business
development and  science for the next
generation and head off many problems before
they become serious.  An international working
group, with the U.S. Space Command and
NASA as key players, should begin now to
shape the Guard and put this concept into
action.
DISCLAIMER:   Opinions expressed in this
paper are solely those of the authors.  This
paper does not represent the views, policies, or
plans of Analytic Services Inc. (ANSER),, the
U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or
the United States Government.
NOTE: All cost estimating used the DoD-
approved ACEIT software program.
Author Biographies
Matt Bille, Robyn Kane, and Martin Oetting are
the key team members for ANSER Aerospace
Operation’s Division Tactical Satellite Center of
Excellence, providing requirements, technology,
and cost analysis concerning microsatellites to
Air Force Space Command and other clients.
Matt Bille is a Senior Research Analyst for
ANSER.  He holds a B.S. and a Master’s
degree in Public Administration and a Master’s
in Space Systems Management.  Matt has
published 15 articles and papers on space
technology  and is co-authoring a book on the
history of small satellites. He is a member of the
AIAA’s Space Operations and Support
Technical Committee.
Robyn A. Kane is a Systems Analyst for
ANSER.  She holds a Master’s in Mathematics/
Statistics and a B.S. in Mathematics/Spanish. In
addition to her microsatellite work, she has led
costing efforts for Minuteman ICBM upgrade
programs and is a cost estimator for the Space
Based Laser program.  She is a member of the
Military Operations Research Society and the
Society for Cost Estimating and Analysis.
Martin Oetting is a Senior Satellite Systems
Engineer for ANSER. He holds a B.S. and M.S.
in Physics and has spent over a decade working
with space systems. His expertise is
concentrated in satellite operations, launch
readiness, and anomaly investigation. He is a
member of the AIAA, INCOSE and AFCEA.
Donna Dickey is the Air Force Research
Laboratory Rocket Propulsion Directorate's
liaison with Air Force Space Command.  She
holds a B.S. in Aeronautical and Astronautical
Engineering.  She has been an engineer with the
BMDO National Hover Test Facility, the Air
Force and Navy LEAP interceptor programs,
the MSTI satellite, the and XSS microsatellite
program.
References
                                         
1 "Teal Group Forecasts 1,447 Satellites, 850-900
Launches Worldwide Through 2009," Teal
Group Press release, June 18, 1999.
2 The term "Space Guard" does not imply any
connection to the completely unrelated
"SpaceGuard" asteroid-tracking initiative
promoted by Dr. David Johnson.  See David
Johnson, "SpaceGuard Only Looking One Way,"
SpaceDaily, http://spacedaily.com/spacecast/
news/oped-99f.html, accessed July 14, 1999.
3 Nicholas L. Johnson and Joseph P. Loftus, Jr.,
"Reducing Orbital Debris: Standards and
Practices," Launchspace, March/April 1999,
p.24.
4 Air University, “Space Traffic Control,”
Spacecast 2020, 1995.
5 MSNBC report, “Space Station Avoids Near
Collision,”
http://www.msnbc.com/news/281202.asp,
accessed June 19, 1999.
6 General Accounting Office, “Space
Surveillance: DOD and NASA Need
Consolidated Requirements and a Coordinated
Plan,” GAO/NSIAD-98-42, December 1997.
7 David C. Harrison and Joseph C. Chow, "The
Space-Based Visible Sensor," Johns Hopkins
APL Technical Digest, 17:2 (1996), p.226.
SSC99-III-6
11
Matt Bille                 13th Annual  AIAA/USU Small Satellite Conference
                                                      
8 Prof. Joanne Gabrynowicz, University of North
Dakota Dept. of Space Studies, personal
communication, June 18, 1999.
9 Nicholas Johnson and Joseph Loftus, Ibid.
10 Bill Jackson and Jim Campbell, "The
Subsystemless Satellite - A New Design
Paradigm For the Next Generation of Small
Satellites," 12th AIAA/USU Small Satellite
Conference, August 31- September 3, 1999.
11 Described at h tp://www.tethers.com, accessed
July 2, 1999.
12 Manufacturer's estimate provided to Air Force
Space Command, May 1999.
13 Satellites are assumed to be purchased in three
blocks in 2001, 2006, and 2011.  Each block
includes 11 Imagers and 6 Mechanics.
14 While civilian personnel may be cheaper, we
have taken the conservative approach by costing
the entire 12-person unit as military (half
enlisted, half officers).  The estimate of 12 is
based on the number required to average 1.5
people on console based on the commercial
ORBCOMM constellation, which has more but
simpler satellites.  See Lewin, Andrew W., “Low-
Cost Operation of the ORBCOMM Satellite
Constellation,” Journal of Reducing Space
Mission Cost, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1998, pp. 105-17.
15 Cost estimate from: ANSER, Tactical Launch
Study, November 1997.
16 Dr. Jim Wertz, Microcosm, personal
communication, July 2, 1999.
17 Peter deSelding, "Orbital Debris Problem
Downplayed in Europe," Space News, July 12,
1999, p.4.
18 Joanne Gabrynowicz, Ibid.
